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I Introduction
1985 begins the sixth year of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
Those Who hoped for a quick settlement and the return of Soviet forces are 
silent Unless the Soviets decide to dramatically increase their forces# 
or expand beyond Afghanistan or —  improbably —  to unilaterally concede 
defeat and withdraw it appears that the next five years will still find 
them enmeshed in a savage war of attrition
While considerable attention has been given to the impact of the 
invasion on Afghanistan and on the rela _ions between the U S S R  and the 
United States relatively little has been given to its impact upon 
Afghanistan s neighbors to the south and east —  a region containing about 
a quarter of the world s population  ^ Was the Soviet invasion in support 
of sonne important regional goal*5 What effect will it have on the must 
important regional conflicts that pre-date it# especially that between 
India and Pakistan7 What are the prospects for a major escalation of the 
war into Pakistan# or even of a joint Indo-Soviet move against Pakistan7 
Not only have these questions been submerged in the larger debate over the 
strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion but it is our contention 
that what has passed for analysis has often been wrong This essay first 
reviews Soviet regional policies and interests# including the situation in 
Afghanistan, and then turns to these critical questions
/
2II Soviet Regional Influence
Twenty—five years ago there was virtually no important support for the 
Soviet Union in South Asia except for the pro-Soviet wing of the Communist 
Party of India (CPI) and a few ideological supporters in the Indian 
Congress Party The Communist Party of Pakistan was outlawed and in any 
case had a small following Russian influence in Afghanistan was 
competitive but marginal (even then the local communist party was sharply 
divided)2 and there was no Soviet presence in Nepal and Ceylon The 
Soviets were about to enter into a major arms deal with India —  the 
licensed manufacture of the MiG-21 interceptor —  but Indian MiGs did not 
fly until 1964 and Indian defense planners had largely turned to the west 
after their border war with China in 1962 Indeed American and 
Camonwealth air forces participated in joint exercises with their Indian 
Air Force counterparts, India adopted seme of the McNamara innovations in 
defense planning, and several hundred U S military personnel were 
stationed in Irdia until 1965 2 A large U S civilian and military
presence remained in Pakistan until 1965 Pakistan then liked to term 
itself the mast allied of allies , with strong ties to CENTO SEATO, and a 
bí-lateral U S military treaty
By 1985 the Soviets will have planted themselves firmly and perhaps 
permanently —  in a devastated Afghanistan They have cordial relations 
with Pakistan even as they regularly accuse that state of aiding 
insurgents in Afghanistan their economic projects including a steel 
mill in Karachi are on schedule The Soviet presence in Nepal, Sri Lanka,
3and Bangladesh remains minimal but that certainly is not the case in 
India Which has become closely linked to the Soviet economy and defense 
establishment through massive purchases of weapons often bartered by 
Indian-made consumer goods ^ The Indian Air Force is a display case of 
recent Soviet technology, the Navy is more than half Soviet or Polish in 
origin and the Indian Army is newly dependent upon the Soviet Union for 
armor All of this, one might add twenty—five years after a program of 
defense self-reliance was begun by V K Krishna Menon and Jawaharlal 
Nehru
Does the above picture represent a steady expansion of Soviet 
influence in South Asia over the past twenty-five years9 Is there any 
substance to the Soviet boast just over twenty years ago that two billion 
people would be living under Canmunist rule by 198CP5 With the significant 
exception of Afghanistan (on its way to becoming a Soviet Central Asian 
republic m  all but name) it does not ^ Soviet influence was greater in 
South Asia in 1966-71, when the U S had virtually withdrawn fron the 
region The Soviets presided over the Tashkent meeting which formally 
ended the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (and received American blessings for their 
efforts) They found themselves supplying weapons to both India and 
Pakistan in 1968, and, after the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
of 1971 they greatly increased their weapons supplies to India Some have 
argued that it was at this point that they realized the significance of 
their Far Eastern military buildup, which was used to deter China from 
entering the 1971 conflict on the side of Pakistan 7 The Soviets also 
floated their regional security treaty during this period, and it was given 
serious consideration in New Delhi, although ultimately rejected However,
4they failed (as had the British and the Americans before them) to unite the 
two major South Asian states into a de facto alliance than might serve 
broader Soviet interests And of course canmunist ideology remains 
unattractive to the South Asian states, most of all in Afghanistan where it 
is sustained by a massive Soviet military presence 8 The present 
situation is not a case of more or less Soviet influence than in 1960 or 
1965 or even 1970 it is a different kind of influence more brutal more 
direct, far more costly but fixed upon the same goals
III Soviet Regional Interests
The interests of most states fall into one or two categories direct 
and indirect Direct interests involve relations with regions or other 
countries which are themselves important Indirect interests involve third 
parties state A is interested in state B because of B s relationship to C 
Change the B-C relationship (or the A-C relationship) and A-B ties vanish 
at least as far as A is concerned
Soviet interests in South Asia are almost all indirect in nature and 
strategic in objective The obvious exception is the involvement in 
Afghanistan, although even that is partially explicable by Soviet concerns 
elsewhere ^
As for India Pakistan Bangladesh, Nepal and S n  Lanka the Soviet 
connection is based on indirect strategic, not ideological cultural, or 
economic considerations In India, where the Soviets move most freely and 
are most enthusiastically received, there is little personal warmth or 
ideological fervor
To the Soviets, India remains a bourgeosie society at the top and a
pre-revolutionary quagmire at the botton for their part, the Indians, 
even those with the strongest attachment to the Soviet tie (such as Indira 
Gandhi) do not hesitate to crack down on the Indian cannumsts when it 
suits their danestic needs 10
Soviet interests m  South Asia are certainly not economic Although 
the Indian trade and barter arrangement is convenient, the Soviets are 
under no conçois ion to export their weapons to India nor are they dependent 
upon any raw materials or finished products they acquire fron South Asia 
They get a quantity of cheap natural gas fron Afghanistan, but this hardly 
determined their invasion The Soviets see no military threat from South 
Asia nor do any South Asian countries belong to an alliance directed 
against them The Soviets were after all, able to live in harmony with a 
Shah of Iran who was heavily dependent upon American weapons They had 
earlier normalized their relations with Pakistan after Ayub Khan made it 
clear that Pakistan was not in CENTO or 3EAT0 because of anti-Soviet 
reasons ^  In any case, there has been virtually no serious American 
military presence in South Asia since 1965, yet this very period saw the 
greatest expansion of Soviet military and economic aid to the area
Finally, sane see the Soviet connection to India as important because 
of the latter s role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) While it is 
undoubtedly useful to the Soviets to have a friendly state once again 
assume importance in NAM India is neither a showcase of Soviet technology 
nor a totally trustworthy partner Cubans and others have been available 
for several years to express the authentic Soviet position in this and 
related fora
Soviet interests in South Asia are primarily strategic in nature and
derive almost entirely fron the long-standing Sino-Soviet conflict They 
are thus indirect and fluctuate with the state of Sino-Soviet relations
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and with those between China and individual South Asian states Nothing 
brings Soviet generals to New Delhi (bearing gifts of military hardware) 
faster than the prospect of Sino-Indian negotiations over their border 
dispute 12 Similarly nothing troubles the Soviets more about Pakistan 
than that country s continuing military and strategic tie with China even 
the new American connection with Pakistan is less important This was true 
even m  the 1960s American intelligence flights frem Pakistan and Turkey 
embarassed but did not directly threaten the Soviet Union and such 
national means of verification have since been legitimized by the various 
SALT treaties The Russians find it more troubling to see another major 
carmumst pewer exercizing an independent dipicmacy along or near the 
Soviet periphery even it it is a diplomacy aimed at easing pressure on 
China itself by strengthening states with a cannon strategic interest 13 
For the Soviets China alone or China plus Pakistan does not pose a vital 
threat 14 However China in combination with a large industrial power 
could pose such a threat The prospect of a China-U S -Pakistan 
relationship must be seen in this broader context not only does it 
strengthen an unfriendly (albeit not hostile) state that can embarass the 
Soviets in Afghanistan it is a potential link in a broader security system 
which would be an effective counter to Soviet power The direct link 
between China and Pakistan is particularly galling this allows direct 
passage between Sirikiang and Gilgit, and traverses the Karakorams only a 
few miles from Afghanistan s Wakhan corridor This desolate area is the 
meeting place of four historic empires (the British Indian, the Persian
7the Russian, and the Chinese) The Soviets must regard it as having great 
symbolic and strategic value, as they occupied it simultaneously with their 
capture of Kabul and other major Afghan cities
Ccrnpared with their sensitivity to China the growing Soviet interest 
in the Indian Ocean is secondary 15 The Soviet Union remains a land-based 
state, aware of, and excessively fearful of the diversity on its borders 
especially along the three quarters of the U S S R  that lies in Asia 1^ 
China represents one kind of challenge to Soviet regional damnation, the 
fall of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan represented another both have 
implications for our understanding of whether the Soviet Union seeks 
influence equality, hegemony or dominance in its regional relations
While the most important Soviet interests m  South Asia derive from 
their military, ideological, and strategic concerns vis a vis China, the 
pursuit of as such an interest necessarily generates side effects Over a 
long period of time civil and military bureaucracies acquire a stake in the
maintenance of the relationship, and changing it can be difficult in the
1face of their inertia But the Soviets have been adept at switching sides 
when opportunities arise and conditions aiter The present structure of 
Soviet involvement and ccmmtment in South Asia is vulnerable in three
t
ways
First if Sino-Soviet relations improved neither would have as great 
an incentive to support what they believe to be their regional surrogates 
Pakistan and India Such a normalization is improbable ^  Somewhat more 
probable are two other developments One involves Soviets interests in 
Iran and the Persian Gulf Should the Gulf s politics become more 
unstable seme Soviet strategists might argue that a warmer relationship
8with Pakistan might pay considerable dividends in a region Where there 
already is a major Pakistani military presence, even at the cost of 
strained relations with India For the Soviets the calculation would be 
the relative value of India vis a vis China versus the relative value of 
Pakistan vis a vis the Gulf and Afghanistan such a closer Soviet-Pakistan 
relationship might just detach Pakistan from Chinese and American influence 
as well The present Pakistani leadership is unlikely to subscribe to such 
a policy but there are those in the political caimunity, and even within 
the military who have argued for closer ties to the Soviets ^8 Frcm 
Pakistan s perspective this would also raise the prospect of delinking 
India frcm the Soviet Union India would thus be faced with a genuine 
strategic dilenma It is suiply less useful than Pakistan in any grouping 
aimed at the Soviet Union Yet the Chinese would have little incentive to 
normalize their relationship with India, except to embarrass the Soviets 
(the India-China and Soviet-China border disputes being very similar in 
origin)
The third alternative to the present structure of Soviet influence in 
South Asia would be an increase in regional cooperation, free frcm Soviet 
control Were India to conclude that closer ties to Pakistan lessened its 
need for Soviet arms and that its own power was more than sufficient to 
enable it to negotiate on an equal basis with China, it might do a deal 
with both antagonists and emerge as a powerful regional leader free frcm 
the stigma of its Soviet military connection
To summarize Soviet interests in South Asia are largely indirect 
and derived from its more important conflict with the People s Republic of 
China India is one of the few countries with a live border with China
9ard could be vitally important to the Soviets in case of a major conflict 
with the PRC ^  There is no evidence that the Indians have agreed to such 
a role (and the Soviets must be uncertain as to hew useful the Indians 
would actually be in such a crisis) but only India and Vietnam have the 
capacity and motivation to assist the Soviets in balancing China 
Strengthening these states does not threaten any established Soviet 
position in South or Southeast Asia 20
IV The Soviets m  Afghanistan
It is difficult to be optimistic about negotiating the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan 21 They have repeatedly stated that Afghanistan must not only 
continue to pursue a foreign policy that is ccmpatible with Soviet 
interests, but that the revolution (really, a coup) of 1978 must not be 
aborted They have been willing to pay a stiff price for their Afghan war 
not because they see Afghanistan as a route to the warm waters of the 
Indian Ocean (or even the Persian Gulf) but because Afghanistan new falls 
into that category of allied border state which includes Mongolia and 
Eastern Europe Force had to be used to save a pro-Soviet group in 
Afghanistan because it could not be as easily used in Poland the Soviets 
wanted to show those who might challenge them, especially in the WTO 
countries, that if pushed they would act They will not 'trade 
Afghanistan for Nicaragua or Cuba, but they will agree to talk 
indefinitely, as long as they can continue the building of an 
infrastructure of loyal— if not happy— Afghans This is going to take a
long time, and the Soviet Union would be most pleased if outsiders were to 
offer guarantees that would ease the process of Sovietization 22 Pakistani
10
and Iranian support for the Mujahiddin is troublesome but the Soviets have 
the option of forcing even more refugees across their borders, further 
destabilizing these countries 23
The Soviet!za11 on of Afghanistan may take a very long time— indeed it 
may never be completed The Soviets have found the Afghans to be a much 
tougher foe than they expected 24 From a military perspective the gradual 
increase in Soviet troops in Afghanistan over the past year (to about 
150,000), and the adoption of large-scale search and destroy missions aimed 
at the destruction of crops, represents a slight change m  Soviet 
tactics 25 But this is matched by the gradual improvement in Afghan 
tactics, weapons, and greater coordination between different guerilla 
groups The war, after five years remains a more violent stalemate with 
no sign that either side will bend, let alone yield and negotiate
While, the military and political battles continue, the Soviets will 
take whatever benefits they can from Afghanistan Natural gas and mineral 
resources are promising, and balance some of the costs of war and 
occupation so would be the use of Afghan territory by military forces 
Which are oriented towards the Gulf, the Indian Ocean or further afield 
These, however, are the perquisites of imperialism, not in this case its 
cause
V The Impact on South Asia
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, their role in the rest of South 
Asia was at low ebb While the Janata government had negotiated a major 
arms deal with the Soviets, it had preferred Western weapons when they were 
available The dominant strategic issue was India s growing military power
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vis a vis Pakistan not an anticipated Soviet invasion Indeed, it took 
all South Asians by surprise, although leaders in Islamabad were warning 
visitors m  April, 1978 that the coup was irreversable and that the Soviets 
had achieved a foothold in the subcontinent
Pakistan had earlier responded to India s growing military power by 
embarking upon a covert nuclear program Yet its chief concerns were 
with domestic order, as the military regime led by Zia ul-Haq had not yet 
stabilized But Islamabad acknowledged India s conventional military 
dominance, and had adjusted its cwn strategy along more defensive lines, as 
all three the Indian services had begun to embrace a more offensive-minded 
approach
Despite Pakistan s relative position of weakness it had responded to 
Janata s moves to normalize their relations Vihen Janata lost power 
Pakistan assumed the initiative, offering a no-war pact to India 27 Both 
Indian and Pakistan adjusted sane of their policies after 1979, and have 
cooperated in the South Asian Regional Council (SARC) first proposed by 
Bangladesh
Thus, at a general level the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not 
caused any serious change m  relations among the states of South 
Asia— excepting, of course, between Afghanistan and the rest Afghanistan 
has not been invited to join SARC and all South Asian states— including 
India— called for the withdrawal of at least foreign forces fron 
Afghanistan
However, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has jolted the balanced 
imbalance between India and Pakistan Sane had hoped that the Soviet 
presence wculd bring the two states closer together this has not
12
happened Yet, they have not been driven into war India has not 
threatened Pakistan but it has complained loudly and frequently about 
Pakistan s efforts to rearm itself Pakistanis recognize that the Indians 
could have done worse (and sane have recently predicted an Indian 
escalation of Indian pressure against them) but they remain suspicious of 
India just as they remain apprehensive about the prospects of increased 
Soviet pressure from the west 28
The remainder of this essay explores these two strategic consequences 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan s exquisite vulnerability, 
and India s sudden strategic irrelevance
VI Pakistan s Soviet Threat
Pakistan is row a state with a three-front security problem The 
threat fron India originates in the partition of British India in 1947 It 
has been extended vertically and hortizontally as the Indians have 
developed their military infrastructure in Rajasthan and have acquired 
aircraft (the British Jaguar) that can penetrate to every comer of 
Pakistan The second threat is internal Pakistan has major dissident 
groups and regions, most notably Sind and Baluchistan, and the military 
regime of Zia ul-Haq remains less than popular Paradoxically, the most 
recent threat— fran the Soviets or their Afghan clients— is also the 
oldest It is the latest manifestation of a very old great game of 
imperial expansion, a game that began in the Nineteenth century, but which 
had virtually disappeared from public consciousness for the past 
twenty-five years 29 Pakistan has found itself in the unenviable position 
of the boy who cried wolf often without much conviction— but the wolf has
13
arrived
The gravest threat to Pakistan is not from a single source but from a 
combination of external or external and internal sources Foreign support 
for dissidents and Soviets or Indian forces acting in concert would present 
an overwhelming military problem While Pakistan has a large and 
well-trained military, Indian forces are much bigger, and the Soviets have 
theoretically, an unlimited potential
This image of Pakistan threatened on both fronts, and at heme, has led 
many observers to conclude that its military situation is hopeless Before 
the Soviet invasion, Indians had expected Pakistan to recognize its 
permanent inferiority and fit itself into an India-dcminated system of 
regional security 30 Many Pakistanis felt that they had fallen behind 
India in conventional arms, and this led Zulfiquar All Bhutto to embark 
upon a covert nuclear program When the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, 
Pakistan's strategic vulnerability was again stressed by a number of 
observers they opposed military support for Pakistan on the grounds that 
it might provoke the Soviets to fanent rebellion in Baluchistan many 
Pakistani civilians (and seme in the military) threw up their hands at the 
prospect of resistance, and urged a policy of conciliation with the Soviet 
Union and even India Finally, Pakistan continues to be criticized for 
failing to move more of its forces to ths Durand Line keeping them across 
the border fron India this is taken as evidence that Pakistan does not 
take the Soviet threat seriously, and is using its American aid to build up 
its capacity against India A careful analysis of the actual terrain 
involved, the level of Soviet forces presently in Afghanistan, and the 
historical precedents, would indicate that Pakistan's military situation is
&
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not as desparate as the above suggests and that the impact of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan on Pakistan has been miscalculated
First the Soviet force levels in Afghanistan are barely adequate to 
control the major cities and only intermittently control major road routes 
Soviet/Afghan airpower ranges unopposed over Afghanistan but would meet a 
technological equal in the PAF Sane idea of the increase in Soviet forces 
necessary to pose a major threat to Pakistan can be gained fron earlier 
calculations of the defenslbility of the N W F P and Baluchistan The 
British estimated that a joint Afghan-Soviet invasion force would be 
required to pose a threat to India, and that it could be met with an Indian 
force of about the same size (five divisions) as Pakistan now has deployed 
along the Durand Line 31 Further, a major increase in enemy forces m  
Afghanistan then— as new— could be quickly detected and matched by a 
smaller increase in defensive forces Pakistan s current deployment seems 
reasonable if it is regarded as a forward defense force and the rest of 
the army as a ready reserve
Second, the canbat record of the Pakistan Army is such that the 
Soviets could expect a stiff battle The Pakistan Army may be the best 
army that never won a war Its performance in the invasion of India in 
1965 was excessively zealous it fought well m  East Pakistan (even though 
demoralized and often ineptly led), and there is no evidence— despite a 
great deal of insinuation— that its involvement in politics since 1977 has 
seriously hurt its fighting spirit
Third, a direct Soviet attack on Pakistan would raise the prospect of 
American, Chinese, and other support A Soviet buildup of ground forces 
would give these and other countries sufficient opportunity to coordinate
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their assistance A rapid buildup of Soviet air units in Afghanistan would 
be possible but this could be quickly countered As for increased 
Soviet/Afghan air strikes on Pakistan, this would be militarily ineffective 
and possibly politically counterproductive Such pressure, whether on the 
ground or in the air, might force Pakistan to reduce its support for the 
Mujahiddm but there are limits to Pakistan s ability to enforce such a 
policy in the NWFP
The Soviet military threat to Pakistan has been exaggerated Pakistan 
has sustained its precarious security wiJh a modest increase in its forces 
What has dramatically changed is the prospects for a two-front war, with 
Soviet and Indian pressure applied at the same time, overwhelming 
Pakistan s defenses Pakistan s reserves for the Rajasthan/Sind front are 
the same troops that are deployed against the Afghans and Soviets m  
Baluchistan if these reserves were frozen in place, Pakistan would be at a 
severe military disadvantage If one includes the prospect of internal 
disorder, then Pakistan s situation could become desperate The critical 
question becomes, therefore, not whether the Soviets threaten Pakistan, but 
whether joint pressure is applied by the Soviets and the Indians
VII India and Afghanistan
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a considerable surprise to 
India which had not been told m  advance of Soviet intentions 
Compounding India's embarassment, the first public statement on the probi on 
by the new government of Indira Gandhi had to be retracted India s polite 
and private suggestions to the Soviets that they withdraw have been simply 
ignored In any case, the Indira Gandhi government was more concerned with
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the indirect consequences of the Soviet invasion than the direct it 
launched a vehement campaign against U S military support for Pakistan 
lobbying intensively (and with seme effectiveness) m  Washington
This modest addition to Pakistan s weaponry was in terms of the 
Indo-Pakistan military balance quite significant The Indian military had 
embraced a first-strike (or pre-emptive strike) military doctrine over the 
1970s, and had drawn selectively on the Soviet Union to fill m  gaps in its 
inventory The Soviet invasion had, indirectly not only aided Pakistan s 
rearmament but put India in an embarassmg position vis a vis the Soviets 
India could have managed the crisis by taking up Pakistan s offer of 
negotiations over arms levels, troops disposition and other 
security-related issues, by moving more quickly in their negotiations with 
China, and by accepting American offers of arms sales This would have 
reduced their dependency upon Soviet weapons and the need for such weapons 
But the military has stuck to their goal of complete dominance over 
Pakistan, an! the 1980 arms deal with the Soviets has been followed by two 
others of equal or greater magnitude ^2 india is buying the most advanced 
Soviet weapons, and may produce seme of them in its own arms factories 
The Soviets have offered to let India handle the entire spare-parts 
production of such obsolete weapons as the MiG-21, and will allow India to 
manufacture the T-72 tank India defense experts remain divided over such 
offers they would enhance India's defense production sector, but at the 
cost of Soviet control over sales and transfers (the Soviets refused to 
allow India bo sell MiG-21 spare parts to Egypt after that country cut its 
Soviet military ties) The technology is attractive, but the terms and 
political restrictions violate directly India s long-term goal of defense
17
production autarky
The paradox of increasing Indian dependence upon the Soviet Union at 
just the nonent When the Soviets have entered South Asia as a military 
power is explained by sane as one manifestation of India s client status, 
and by others as indication of a long-range plan in which both countries 
will join forces and swallow up Pakistan These suspicions surfaced most 
recently during a Joint Intelligence Ccnmittee briefing and are, or 
course, stressed by seme Pakistani strategists who have decried 
Indo-Soviet collusion for years 33 jf either of these arguments are 
correct— if India is a client of the Soviets or if their interests 
parallel the Soviets'— then the situation in South Asia is grave indeed 
Ultimately, we could expect the joint pressure of these two giant states to 
overwhelm Pakistan and it is unlikely that Pakistan s distant friends can 
do much about it The Soviets will obtain a foothold in Pakistan itself 
either directly, or through client states along the Afghan border 
Finally, the alleged Soviet dream of a warm-water port will be fulfilled, 
as these client states knuckle under to Soviet demands 34 por a nurr¡ber of 
reasons, these arguments do not seem plausible, and it is very unlikely 
that India will join with the Soviet Union in pressuring Pakistan, or risk 
a solo attack on Pakistan
First, Pakistan is an irritant to India but does not pose a vital 
threat India has uncovered no substantial evidence that Pakistan intends 
to attack it, or that it supports any of the several terrorist or insurgent 
movements underway in India, or even that its nuclear program would be a 
threat Pakistan s rearmament makes it more difficult for India to 
maintain rough superiority on land and in the air, but in a long war India
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would have the advantage in numbers However it can no longer hope for a 
quick victory
Second, the Indian armed forces are themselves temporarily vulnerable 
Many of the indigenously built weapons systems are no longer modem and the 
Indian defense industry is incapable of producing adequate replacements 
Thus India has had to turn abroad for wholesale replacement of its ageing 
armor force and many aircraft types In many years its superiority over 
Pakistan has been about 1 6  1 in the former and 2 5 1 in the latter 35 
The disaster of the Golden Temple occupation (Operation Bluestar ) 
revealed inadequate intelligence poor civil-military coordination, and the 
untrustworthiness of many Sikh units The IAF has at least twice as many 
Sikhs, proportionately, as the Army’s 10% and must be regarded as an 
uncertain instrument
Third, the alleged Soviet connection is problematic There are 
several possible cases the Soviets could ask India for assistance against 
Pakistan, India could ask the Soviets for assistance should they decide to 
rectify the Kashmir border or otherwise pressure Pakistan, and both, for 
different motives, could agree on a join, strategy of pressure However, 
the likely Indian calculation in each of these cases probably suggests 
caution
A Soviet request for Indian assistance (or, as seme would put it a 
request that India act on behalf of the Soviets) would be analyzed 
carefully in New Delhi in terms of Indian gains and losses Any kind of 
Indian pressure on Pakistan runs the risk of Pakistani air retaliation, 
ground warfare, and foreign involvement India would want to make certain 
that an initial attack on Pakistan would quickly end the war with Indian
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objectives achieved These might include complete incorporation of Kashmir 
and its hinterlands (such as Gilgit) and bringing a more pliable Pakistani 
government into power Could Indian arms achieve such goals right now”5 A 
reading of the levels and quality of the two armed forces leads me to 
conclude that it is doubtful, without a substantial improvement in weapons 
intelligence, AWACS and probably more than passive Soviet assistance 
Yet any sign of the latter risks outside assistance to Pakistan In such 
a scenario, India would have only a marginal chance of success in an 
initial attack, which, if it failed, would leave India alone against a 
whole array of forces
Yet to join with the Soviets ensures that India will be treated as a 
Soviet client Even if Pakistan could be defeated the political 
economic, and military costs would be high India s relations with China 
ani the U S would be gravely injured, and the former might identify India 
fully as a Soviet proxy
Further, a joint Indo-Soviet operation, even if successful provides 
no guarantee agianst future clashes with the Soviet Union along their 
likely new border Would this border be drawn at the Hindu Kush, the 
Durand Line, or the Indus7 Would several post-Pakistani states emerge7 
Which of these would become Soviet, Chinese or Indian clients? What would 
Iniia do if one of its clients were to become entangled with a Soviet 
client constructed out of the old Pakistan? In any such conflict, or in a 
heightened conflict with China, good relations with the U S would be 
essential— but these would not survive a joint Indo-Soviet operation 
against Pakistan India might be tempted to join with the Soviet Union in 
attacking Pakistan in a situation which paralleled 1970, when Pakistan
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itself was in a state of civil war and millions of refugees had fled to 
India India s intervention was rapid and decisive and a pro-Indian 
government was put in power in the new state of Bangladesh While Indians 
today are concerned about the modest growth of Pakistani power, informed 
Indian strategists recognize that while a weak Pakistan suits Indian 
interests a broken Pakistan does not, bicause of the presence of Soviet 
forces a mere two hundred and fifty miles from Indian territory
The third case— a Soviet attack on Pakistan— is more problematic If 
the Soviets attacked Pakistani airfields and bases, or engaged in hot 
pursuit across the Durand Line would India join m? Their present 
calculation might be as follows
— the Soviets are an important source of weapons and political support, and 
must not be directly opposed as long as their actions are limited 
— India must not appear to be supporting the Soviets in word or deed for 
fear of antagonizing the U S , China, and Pakistan s Islamic supporters 
— the critical question will be how far are the Soviets prepared to press 
Pakistan, and hew vulnerable is Pakistan to such pressure7 If it appeared 
that Pakistan was yielding or disintegrating, then India would calculate 
prospective advantages associated with its own intervention 
— there is a fair chance that India might disregard its current weapons 
dependency and offer tacit assistance to Pakistan The decision to support 
Pakistan might depend on who was in power in India, but it is a very old 
idea that makes good strategic sense It may be that the Soviets will yet 
inadvertently push these two states to a canton strategic outlook
Our own view, discussed above, is that Pakistan s ability to resist 
Soviet pressure is greater than most observers have imagined Just as a
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number of predictions concerning Pakistan s urminent disintegration have 
net been borne out it may be that expectations concerning Pakistan s 
military weaknesses will be revised New Delhi may yet reconsider its 
strategy of dcminance which has been disrupted by modest additions to 
Pakistan s weapons armed forces Indian regional dcminance may yet be 
achieved through a sharing of the military burden of regional defense The
alternative for India is to engage in an arms race propelled by the actions 
of its own major arms supplier
VIII Conclusion
This essay has discussed extreme cases These are important to 
consider, if only to show that they are not uiminent The real threat to 
Pakistan fron the Soviet Union lies at a lewer level than an all-out 
attack A joint Indo-Soviet attack is even less likely Pakistan s 
capacity to meet such threats— or at least force an attacker to greatly 
increase the level of force required for success— is greater than most 
observers have recognized Even Pakistanis tend to exaggerate their 
security dilemma The glocm that pervaded the conference rooms of 
Pakistani strategists five years ago was unnecessary Pakistan remains a 
powerful, united state with an effective military establishment It has no 
hope of winning against a concerted or long-term threat but short of that 
it is more capable of protecting itself than most of us thought five years 
ago This has several implications for the future of South Asia, and the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan
1) The Soviets entered Afghanistan because of a combination of hubris and 
ignorance, arri, above all, to ensure that a proper ally on its border
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would not fall This may add up to a defensive motive but does not 
mean that the Soviets may not yet exploit Afghanistan for adventures 
further afield It is unlikely that they will move in the direction 
of South Asia Pakistan is a greater obstacle than any they have yet 
encountered and Soviet interests in South Asia are quite different 
than those that brought them into Afghanistan For the Soviets, India 
is the regional dominant state and provides a useful balance against 
the Chinese Pakistan is an irritant, but has been careful to stay 
out of any overtly anti-Soviet arrangement, and retains its 
non-aligned status
2) Soviet expansionism— at least m  South Asia has been a function of 
the weakness of individual states Even if Soviet ambitions were 
unlimited its expansion could only march with opportunity, and the 
opportunities for a move in the direction of Pakistan are less than 
many have thought As was the case of Afghanistan in 1978, internal 
vulnerability is the greatest likely source of change for Pakistan If 
it can continue its very slow march towards stability and broaden the 
scope of political participation so as to include the many justifiably 
dissident groups in Pakistani society, external forces are unlikely to 
be effective If it cannot, any outside pressure will have 
considerable impact
3) The likelihood of Pakistani continued tacit support for the
Mujahiddin is very good It is difficult for the Soviets to stop 
Mujahiddin activity, it would require a great degree of pressure to 
get Pakistan to do so Even if Pakistan wanted to, it would be 
difficult Pakistan is serious about negotiations that would lead to
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the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, but is in a strong 
enough position to insist that there really be such a withdrawal and 
that the Mujahiddin can honorably return to their own country In the 
long run Pakistan°s security would be enhanced by such a settlement, 
even if it meant a loss of some outside support But the whole 
question is conjecture a Soviet withdrawal in the next several years 
is very unlikely
4) It is unlikely that India will join with the Soviet Union m  
pressuring Pakistan, or that it will launch an attack upon Pakistan by 
itself The latter would involve considerable military risk and would 
require a full-scale war The former would be a colossal political 
blunder, and would only leave India in a worse strategic position 
facing the Soviet Army across an uncertain frontier border
5) The old conflict between India and Pakistan still blocks a coordinated 
regional response to the Soviet occupation India missed its moment 
in 1980-81, but that was not necessarily the last chance If a joint 
regional response could be forged, then serious diplomatic and even 
military pressure could be put on the Soviets, along with a concerted 
plan that would ease them out with their dignity intact
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